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SUPREME COURT
ALBANY COUNTY
Day v. Pataki 41
(decided October 23, 1995)
The inmate-petitioner sought an order directing Governor
Pataki to rescind and annul Executive Order No. 5,42 which
prevented the petitioner from participating in a temporary release

program, on the grounds that it violated separation of powers
doctrine principles implied by the New York State
Constitution. 4 3 Since the legislature granted the Commissioner of
the Department of Correctional Services the power to "review
and evaluate all existing rules, regulations and directives relating

to current temporary release programs ... [which may include]
selection criteria, supervision and procedures for the disposition
of each application," 4 4 the court concluded that Executive Order
No. 5 did not usurp the power of the legislature and, thus, did

not violate the State Constitution. 45
Governor Patald, on January 24, 1995, signed Executive Order
No. 5, which prohibits inmates from participating in temporary
release programs if they were convicted of violent felonies and

other listed violent crimes. Shortly thereafter, the Department of
41. 633 N.Y.S.2d 747 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1995).
42. Id. at 748. Executive Order No. 5 provides in pertinent part:
I, George E. Patald, Governor of the State of New York, by virtue of
the authority vested in me by the Constitution and Laws of the State of
New York, do hereby order the Commissioner of the Department of
Correction Services to promulgate, modify, adopt or rescind any rules
or regulations, or emergency rules or regulations, as may be necessary
from time to time to prevent the future transfer to any temporary release
program or residential treatment facility of any inmate sentenced as a
violent felony offender convicted of a crime involving the infliction of
serious physical injury, the use or threatened use of a dangerous
instrument or the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon ....
Id.
43. Id. at 747-48.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 748 (quoting N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 852(1) (McKinney 1987)).
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Corrections amended the rule in question 46 to provide: "[A]n
inmate is barred from participating in the temporary release
program if the inmate's current commitment is for a crime
involving either the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon or
a dangerous instrument or the infliction of serious physical
injury." 47

Consequently,

the

petitioner's

application

to

participate in an industrial training program was denied because
he was serving a sentence for an offense included in Executive
Order No. 5.48 He commenced an Article 78 proceeding alleging
that Executive Order No. 5 violated the doctrine of separation of
powers in that it "is an attempt to create or change the law,
which is the sole responsibility of the Legislature.,, 49
Corrections Law section 852(1) delegates to the Commissioner
of the Department of Correctional Services the power to form
and administrate temporary release programs including the power
to provide rules with respect to eligibility criteria. 50 Applying
Clark v. Cuomo,5 1 the court explained that "in referring to the
doctrine of separation of powers: 'It is only when the Executive
acts inconsistently with the Legislature, or usurps its prerogatives
that the doctrine of separation is violated.' '"52 The court
46. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 7, § 1900.4(c) (1995).
47. Day, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
48. Id.

49. Id.
50. Id. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 852(1) provides:
The Commissioner, guided by consideration for the safety of the
community and the welfare of the inmate, shall review and evaluate all
existing rules, regulations and directives relating to current temporary

release programs and consistent with the provisions of this article for the
administration of temporary release programs shall ...

promulgate new

rules and regulations for the various forms of temporary release. Such
rules and regulations shall reflect the purposes of the different programs

and shall include but not be limited to selection criteria, supervision and
procedures for the disposition of each application.

Id.
51. 66 N.Y.2d 185, 486 N.E.2d 794, 495 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1985).

52. Day, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 748 (quoting Clark v. Cuomo, 66 N.Y.2d at
189, 486 N.E.2d at 797, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 939 (1985)). In Clark, the petitioner

claimed that an executive oOrder, which established a program making voting
registration forms and assistance available at state agencies, violated the
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explained that since the legislature has expressly granted the
Commissioner with the authority to evaluate and apply all rules
relating to the temporary release program, Executive Order No.

5 does not usurp legislative domain nor is it inconsistent with
legislative intent. 53 In conclusion, Governor Pataki's Executive
Order No. 5 does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers
54
since it is consistent with legislative policy.
Dorst v. Pataki 55
(decided October 9, 1995)
Five inmates5 6 at the Albion Correctional Facility in Albion,

New York, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, brought an Article 78 proceeding 57 against Governor

doctrine of separation of powers. Cark, 66 N.Y.2d at 186-87, 486 N.E.2d at
795, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 937-38. The court, rejecting this claim, held that since
the legislature granted the State Board of Elections the power to encourage
voter participation and that voter registration forms should be readily available,
the executive order did not "represent[1 a 'nullification' of legislative action."
Id. at 190, 486 N.E.2d at 798, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 940 (citation omitted).
53. Day, 633 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
54. Id.
55. 633 N.Y.S.2d 730 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1995).
56. Two of the five inmates, Antoinette Ferrer and Miriam Rodriquez,
were approved for the temporary work release program prior to the signing of
Executive Order No. 5. Id. at 737.
57. Generally, an article 78 proceeding is appropriate to determine
whether a statute is being applied in an unconstitutional way. Id. at 732. Bil
see Allen v. Blum, 58 N.Y.2d 954, 956, 227 N.E.2d 68, 68, 460 N.Y.S.2d
520, 521 (1983); Zuckerman v. Board of Educ., 44 N.Y.2d 336, 343-44, 376
N.E.2d 1297, 1301, 405 N.Y.S.2d 652, 656 (1978); Kovarsky v. Housing and
Development Administration, City of N.Y., 31 N.Y.2d 184, 191-92, 286
N.E.2d 882, 885, 335 N.Y.S.2d 383, 387-88 (1972). These cases stand for the
proposition that the court of appeals has uniformly held that it is proper to
convert such a proceeding to a declaratory judgment action where the
"constitutionality of a statute is at issue, or where petitioners seek review of a
continuing policy." Accordingly, the court in this case exercised its discretion
and converted the proceeding into a declaratory judgment action. Dorst, 633
N.Y.S.2d at 732.
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